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STATEMENT

OF JURISDICTION

Defendant Richard L. Holbert appeals from a judgment on
a jury verdict finding him guilty of Aggravated Kidnaping, a
first degree felony, in violation of U.C.A.. § 76-5-302
(1953 As Amended). The defendant was sentenced on January
11, 2001 to serve an indeterminate term of not less than 10
years and which may be for life at the Utah State Prison.
Notice of Appeal was filed with the trial court on February
12, 2001.

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §

78-2a-3.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue One: Did the trial court err in permitting prior
bad act testimony?
Standard of Review:

When reviewing a trial courtfs

decision to admit evidence under of prior convictions,
wrongs and acts, the appellate court applies an abuse of
discretion standard.
P.3d

State

v. Widdison,

2001 UT 60, 1 18,

. In the proper exercise of that discretion,

trial judges must "scrupulously" examine the evidence before
it is admitted. Id.
Issue Two: Did the trial court err in admitting evidence
obtained from the defendant's apartment without a search
warrant?
Case No. 2001047-CA
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Standard of Review:

The trial court's factual findings

are reversed only if clearly erroneous.

State

2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243 (citations omitted).

v.

Finlayson,

However, the

legal effect of those facts is within the province of the
appellate court, and "no deference need be given a [lower]
court's resolution of such questions of law."SLW/Utah,
MacKay v. Hardy,

973 P.2d 941 (Utah 1998).

Issue Three: Was the defendant deprived of his right to
effective assistance of counsel?
Standard of Review:

A

claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel raised for the first time on appeal without a
prior evidentiary hearing presents a question of law.
State

v. Bryant,

965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)

(citations omitted). Questions of law are reviewed nondeferentially for correctness.

State

v\ Pena,

869 P.2d 932,

935-36 (Utah 1994).
Issue Four: Did the evidence support a conviction for
aggravated kidnaping?
Standard of Review.

On appeal, the court reviews the

evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable to the
verdict. State v. Lopez,

2001 UT App 123,

P.3d

,

citing State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 1 42, 994 P.2d 177.

Case No. 2001047-CA
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Whether two or more crimes merge, thereby precluding
separate convictions, is then "essentially an issue of
statutory construction that we review for correctness,
according no particular deference to the trial court."

Id.

(citations omitted).
Issue Five:

Was confidence in a fair trial undermined

by the cumulative effect of errors committed during trial?
Standard of Review:

Under the cumulative error

doctrine, the appellate court will reverse a conviction only
if "the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines
our confidence . . . that a fair trial was had." State
Medina-Juarez,
Kohl,

2001 UT 79,

P.3d

v.

, citing, State v.

2000 UT 35, 1 25, 999 P.2d 7 (citations omitted)

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
ORDINANCES, AND RULES
United States Const. Amen. VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
Utah Statutes
76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping.
Case No. 2001047-CA
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(1) An actor commits aggravated kidnaping if the actor, in
the course of committing unlawful detention or kidnaping:
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon
as defined in Section 76-1-601; or
(b)

acts with intent:

(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield
or hostage, or to compel a third person to engage in
particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in particular
conduct;
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or
flight after commission or attempted commission of a felony;
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a
felony;
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim
or another;
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental
or political function; or
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76,
Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses.
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing
unlawful detention or kidnaping" means in the course of
committing, attempting to commit, or in the immediate flight
after the attempt or commission of a violation of:
(a)

Section 76-5-301, kidnaping; or

(b)

Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention.

(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less
than 6, 10, or 15 years and which may be for life. Imprisonment is mandatory in accordance with Section 76-3-406.
76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
(1)

A person commits aggravated assault if he commits

Case N o . 2001047-CA
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assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a)
or

intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another;

(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of
Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (1)(a) is a second degree
felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (1)(b) is a third degree
felony.
Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant
evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these
rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
Case No. 2001047-CA
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(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused,
or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a
character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the
victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a
witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In
other words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible
if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the
requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of witness.
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The
credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject
to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2)
evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the
character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked
by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the
conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction
of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of

Case No. 2001047-CA
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the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness,
be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1)
concerning the witness 1 character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to
which character the witness being cross-examined has
testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any
other witness, does not; operate as a waiver of the accused's
or the witness' privilege against self-incrimination when
examined with respect to matters which relate only to
credibility.
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to
misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by
examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced.
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime.
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403,
if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which the witness was
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted
of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines
that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is
not admissible if a period of more than ten years has
elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release
of the witness from the confinement imposed for that
conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court
determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative
value of the conviction supported by specific facts and
circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial
effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than ten
Case N o .
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years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance
written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of
such evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of
rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible
under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject
of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or
other equivalent procedure based on a finding of the
rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has
not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year,
or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon,
annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding
of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile
adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule.
The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of
a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused
if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack
the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that
admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination
of the issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) Pendency of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom
does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible.
Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Richard L. Holbert appeals from a judgment on
a jury verdict finding him guilty of Aggravated Kidnaping, a
first degree felony, in violation of U.C.A.. § 76-5-302
(1953 As Amended). The defendant was originally charged with
violation of U.C.A. 76-5-103, Aggravated Assault, a third
degree felony.

That charge was dismissed when federal

Case N o . 2001047-CA
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charges were brought against him.

After the defendant was

sentenced on the federal charge, the State re-filed against
the defendant, charging him with Aggravated Kidnaping, in
violation of U.C.A. §76-5-302, a first degree felony, and,
once again, Aggravated Assault.

Just before trial, the

State dismissed the charge for Aggravated Assault.
At a pretrial conference on October 10, 2000, the court
was advised that resolution of a charge against the
defendant for violation of a protective order would trail
the State's prosecution against the defendant on the
kidnaping charge.

The parties agreed that in the event the

defendant was convicted by the jury on the aggravated
kidnaping charge, the defendant would enter a plea of
"guilty" to the protective order violation and the State
would support any sentence imposed for the violation to run
concurrent with the sentence imposed on a subsequent
conviction.
After a three-day trial, the jury returned of verdict o
Guilty of the charge of Aggravated Kidnaping. R. 120. The
defendant moved to arrest judgment. R. 136. The trial court
denied defendant's motion and sentenced him on January 11,
2001 to serve an indeterminate term of not less than 10
years and which may be for life at the Utah State Prison on
Case No. 2001047-CA
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the aggravated kidnaping conviction, and a concurrent term
of zero to five years on the felony protective order
violation.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The defendant and Mrs. Holbert were the only people
inside the home on August 12, 1999 at the time of the
interaction between the parties giving rise to the charges
against the defendant.
The evidence, in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict is as follows: The defendant arrived at Mrs.
Holbertsf home to get his bowling ball.

R. 220 p. 115.

As

Mrs. Holbert was going into the home to get the bowling ball
for him, the defendant
the door behind them.
testified

"shoved"

her into the home and shut

R. 220 p. 118.

Mrs. Holbert

that Mr. Holbert then pulled a gun from his

waistband with one hand and pointed it at her head as he
began to lock the door with his other hand.

R. 220 p. 119.

At the same time, Mrs. Holbert tried to get out the door. R.
220 p. 121.

Mrs. Holbert then ran to the back door of the

home and was able to unlock the chain, dead bolt and
doorknob lock, and open the door at least two inches before
the defendant

slammed the door shut.

R. 220 p. 123.

Holbert either was pushed by the defendant
Case No. 2001047-CA
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bedroom, or she cannot recall how she ended up in the
bedroom.

R. 220 p. 122-124.

Defendant

then shut the

bedroom door and again held the gun toward Mrs. Holberts
head.

R. 220 p. 125. Mrs. Holbert testified that the

defendant told her at that point,
are going to die.

"you want a divorce?

I'm going to kill you."

You

R. 220 p. 125.

In fear for her life, Mrs. Holbert told the defendant that
she did not want a divorce that she wanted to make the
marriage work.

R. 220 p. 126.

Mr. Holbert was distracted

by the ringing doorbell and he left the house. R. 220 p.
127.

The entire incident lasted approximately four minutes.

R. 220 p. 141.
Other witnesses testified at trial, however, none were
inside the home at the time of the event and provided only
circumstantial support for the State's theory.

The State's

only direct evidence of the events inside the home on August
12, 1999 was elicited through Mrs. Holbert.
The State's witnesses included Mrs. Holbert's neighbor,
who testified that she called police after one of the
children told her their dad had "locked them out of the
house, wouldn't let'em in, and that he had their mother in
the house and he was hurting her."

R. 220 p. 170.

The State called an Ogden detective who testified to two
Case No. 2001047-CA
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prior investigations of a protective order violation and
domestic violence which did not produce sufficient evidence
to warrant prosecution.

According to the detective, she

investigated a protective order violation in June which was
not prosecuted due to lack of evidence, R. 220 p. 205, and
she testified that there had been a reported break-in at
Mrs. Holbert's home.

R. 220 p. 207.

The State also called a Clearfield City police officer
testified that he

"learned through the conversation" with

his ex-wife and the defendant's wife that there was a reward
for the apprehension of the defendant.

R. 220 p. 179. The

officer apprehended the defendant in Clearfield on September
27th.

R. 220 p. 177. During a search of the defendant's

backpack incident to the his arrest, the officer discovered
a revolver.

R. 220 p. 183.

The testimonies of the defendant and Mrs. Holbert about
the events of August 12, 1999 differ dramatically.

The

defendant testified at trial that on August 11, 1999, Mrs.
Holbert called him at his apartment at approximately 8:30 in
the evening and asked him to meet her at their home the next
day between 9:00 and 9:30 a.m.

R. 220 p. 307-308.

According to the defendant, Mrs. Holbert had changed her
mind about their "marriage situation" and he could spend
Case No. 2001047-CA
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some time with the family. R. 220 p. 308. When the
defendant arrived at the home the next day, his children
were outside standing beside the car which was parked in the
driveway.

R. 220 p. 312.

Mrs. Holbert was talking on her

cell phone when Defendant approached her. R. 220 p. 315. He
testified that he overheard Mrs. Holbert say into the phone
"he's here." R. 220 p. 317. Mrs. Holbert walked ahead of
him to the front door of the house and she told him to "come
on."

R. 220 p. 317. As they walked past the children, Mrs.

Holbert yelled to the children to get into the car. R.220 p.
317.

The defendant testified

that he recalled wondering

why the children had to get into the car when he thought
they were going to have a visit.

R. 220 p. 319. However, he

continued to follow Mrs. Holbert into the home. Mrs.
Holbert shut the front door and the defendant went into the
bedroom to get a document he understood from Mrs. Holbert to
be there.

R. 220 p. 320. As he walked past the bedroom

dresser, he noticed a gun on the top of the dresser. R. 220
p. 324.

Mrs. Holbert entered the bedroom behind the

defendant, picked up the gun, and pointed at Mr. Holberts'
chest.

R. 220 p. 325. According to the defendant, Mrs.

Holbert asked him why he couldn't be like other guys and
"just leave," and that if she had to kill him, she would.
Case No. 2001047-CA

Page 16 of 47

R. 220 p. 327.
Mrs. Holbert was distracted by the ring of the doorbell.
R. 220 p. 328. When she looked away, the defendant grabbed
the gun and took it from her.

R. 220 p. 328. He admitted

that after he took the gun from her, he did point it back at
her for three to four seconds.

R. 220 p. 328. But, he then

put the gun in his coat pocket, walked past Mrs. Holbert,
who was standing in the bedroom door, and he walked out the
front door.

R. 220 p. 330. Before he left the home, the

defendant indicated he told Mrs. Holbert that she had
tricked him to get him there in order to get him in trouble.
R. 220 p. 330-331. One of the children told him the police
were on their way.

R. 220 p. 331.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Defendant claims several errors by the trial court and
trial counsel which resulted in the introduction at trial of
inadmissible, irrelevant and prejudicial evidence raising
fundamental questions of fairness arising from the
possibility that the defendant's conviction was not based
upon evidence of the events of August 12, 1999, but was
based on his presumed bad character.
The impact of any testimony depends upon the jury's
perception of how credible the witness is. Defendant's
Case No. 2001047-CA
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credibility was damaged, to a significant degree by the
prior crimes, wrongs and acts evidence elicited by the State
during trial.

But for the prejudicial effect of evidentiary

errors throughout the trial, the jury could have found
either found the State failed to meet its burden to prove
the elements of aggravated kidnaping beyond a reasonable
doubt, or it could have found the defendant
guilty of aggravated assault,
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
PRIOR BAD ACT TESTIMONY
Evidence of prior "crimes, wrongs or acts" is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith."

U.R.E. Rule 404(b).

The evidence may be admissible, however, "for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.

In other words, evidence offered under

this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a
non-character purpose" unless the evidence is not relevant
or, if relevant, is not prejudicial.

U.R.E. 402, 403.

Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
Case No. 2001047-CA
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determination of the action more probably or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." U.R.E. 4 01.
The problem with other crimes evidence was succinctly
stated by the Court in State

v.

Doporto,

"the prejudice that can flow from admitting evidence of
other crimes committed by a defendant can be unusually
prejudicial, raising acute concerns of fundamental
fairness arising from the real possibility that the
defendant will be convicted for his presumed bad
character rather than his acts.
935 P.2d 484, 489 (Utah 1997).
When reviewing a trial court's decision to admit
evidence under of prior convictions, wrongs and acts, the
appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard.
State

v. Widdison,

2001 UT 60,5 18,

P.3d

. In the

proper exercise of that discretion, trial judges must
"scrupulously" examine the evidence before it is admitted.
Id.

During the State's direct examination of the defendant's
wife, the State asked Mrs. Holbert about an occurrence on
May 18, 1999.

R. 220 p. 99. Over objection of defense

counsel, the State was permitted to elicit the following
A:

I never got to the phone.
never got it.
unconscious.

I touched the phone, but I

He picked me up by my neck and choked me
When he grabbed me by my neck, I blacked

Case No. 2001047-CA
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out.

I was thrown approximately four to five feet into

my kitchen and hit the kitchen table.

I was then - when

I came to the first time, I was doing a backbend over
the kitchen table and he had his hands around my neck
and he was choking me.

I just remember my back hurting

really bad and him choking me.

I blackout out again.

The second time I came to, I was laying on the kitchen
floor next to the kitchen table with him kneeling over
top of me and choking me.
Q:

Then what happened?

I mean, I guess he stopped at some

point, is that right?
R. 220 p. 101-102.
The State successfully argued that the evidence was
"foundational for the incident that occurred on the 12th of
August just after that because it leads up to everything
that occurred on the day in question."

R. 220 p. 99.

The witness continued, "[H]e then held me hostage for an
hour and a half.

R. 220 p. 101-102.

At that point, defense

counsel objected again to the testimony, the prosecutor
indicated he wasn't "asking for that answer either," and the
objection was sustained as non-responsive.

R. 220 p. 102.

Defense counsel did not request, and the court did not
provide, a curative instruction to the jury.
Case No. 2001047-CA
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The trial court erred in permitting, over objection,
Mrs. Holbert's description of the May 18, 1999 assault
because the testimony's inherently prejudicial effect far
outweighed any minimal probative value to the incident three
months later.

The testimony was not probative of the

defendant's opportunity, preparation, plan, knowledge,
mistake, accident or identity.
Mrs. Holbert's testimony was highly inflammatory and
prejudicial to the defendant.

Any probative value in the

information for foundational purposes was certainly
outweighed by its prejudicial effect in demonstrating to the
jury that the defendant had abused and taken his wife
"hostage" on a previous occasion.

The elicited testimony

went beyond, and was not probative of, the defendant's
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. See, U.R.E.
608. Testimony of the defendant's prior guilty plea to
assault was improper as the assault was not punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year nor did it
involve dishonesty or false statement. See, U.R.E. 609.
Evidence of the incident between the defendant and his wife
several months before the events giving rise to the charges
for which defendant faced trial, even if relevant, was
highly prejudicial.
Case No. 2001047-CA
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character of the defendant in order to show action in
conformity therewith.

The resulting prejudice to the

defendant raises concerns of fundamental fairness arising
from the real possibility that the defendant was convicted
for his presumed bad character rather than his conduct on
August 12, 1999.

The trial court should have prohibited the

testimony.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE DEFENDANT'S APARTMENT
WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT.
Defendant was employed as a maintenance man for Cherry
Creek Apartments and moved into that complex some time in
the summer of 1999.

R. 221 p. 62. The apartment manager

testified that the defendant was paid an hourly wage and
received a discount on his rent.

R. 221 p. 63.

The manager

"was not sure'7 but she believed that the defendant's rent
was "taken out of his check - on a biweekly basis," R. 221
p. 63-64.

At some point, the defendant left a note for the

manager indicating that he "was not going to be working at
Cherry Creek anymore."

R. 221 p. 63-64.

The manager did

not recall if the note indicated the defendant would not be
living at Cherry Creek as well. R. 221 p. 65.

After the

manager did not see the defendant for "a number of days,"
the apartment was posted with a note on the door giving
Case No. 2001047-CA
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notice that the apartment had been abandoned1.

R. 221 p. 65.

After the manager determined the apartment had been
abandoned, she permitted Detective Croyle to "look at
things."

R. 221 p. 66.

Detective Croyle was recalled by the State to testify as
to

telephone numbers she had retrieved from defendant's

caller I.D. inside the defendant's apartment.

Detective

Croyle testified that the apartment manager was "going to
box the stuff up and put it in a storage shed and hold it
for another 30 days."

R. 221 p 69.

Defendant's trial

counsel objected to the detective's search of the
defendant's property without first obtaining a search
warrant.

R. 221 p 69.

The State responded that the

defendant's expectation of privacy dissipated after the
apartment had been abandoned, and that the apartment owner
had the ability to give permission to the peace officer to

1

Abandonment is presumed where the tenant has not
notified the owner that he or she will be absent from the
premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days
after the due date, and there is no reasonable evidence that
the tenant is occupying the premises; or, the tenant has not
notified the owner that he or she will be absent from the
premises, and the tenant fails to pay rend when due and the
tenant's personal property has been removed from the
dwelling unit and there is no reasonable evidence that the
tenant is occupying the premises. U.C.A. 78-36-12.3. From
the testimony available in the record, it does not appear
that the requirements for abandonment were established.
Case No. 2001047-CA
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enter the premises once that determination had been made.
R. 221 p. 71.

The court made the following finding:

...that the testimony has been that the defendant left a
note in the office of the management indicating that he
had left the premises in advance of the end of the
month, that the management deemed that he had abandoned
the premises, and as a result, there is no expectation
of privacy. And, therefore, the premises have been
returned to the management. The management had a right
to allow this detective to enter the premises without
the necessity of a search warrant."
R. 221 p. 71.

The court's finding was clearly erroneous

because it was based on an incorrect statement of the
manager's testimony.

The manager testified that the

defendant left a note for the manager indicating that he
"was not going to be working at Cherry Creek anymore." R.
221 p. 63-64.
court,

The manager did not, as indicated by the

recall if the note indicated the defendant would not

be living at Cherry Creek as well.

R. 221 p. 65.

Therefore, the testimony was unclear as to whether the
defendant intended to abandon his apartment when he resigned
from his position as maintenance man for the complex.
Whether the defendant abandoned his apartment for search
and seizure purposes, is a factual question of intent to
voluntarily relinquish a reasonable expectation of privacy.
State v. Rowe,

806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd on other

grounds by State v.

Rowe,

Case No. 2001047-CA
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burden of proving abandonment falls on the state,

Id.

(citations omitted), and must be shown by "clear,
unequivocal and decisive evidence."
omitted).

Id.

(citations

It is "measured from the vantage point" of the

defendant, and not the police."

Id.

(citations omitted).

"It is only the defendant's state of mind that counts."

Id.

In this case, the state failed in its burden to show by
"clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence" that the
defendant intended to voluntarily relinquish a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his apartment when he tendered his
resignation as maintenance man for the apartment complex.
The only testimony offered in support of abandonment came in
through the apartment manager who did not recall whether the
defendant indicated he would not be living at the apartment
complex.

The court presumed the defendant left prior to the

end of the month.

The manager believed defendant's rent was

automatically deducted from his paycheck on a bi-weekly
basis.

There was no "unequivocal" evidence that defendant's

rent was not paid through the end of the month, and the
detective testified she could not recall which date she went
into the apartment.
The State did not meet its burden to show by clear,
unequivocal and decisive evidence that the defendant
Case No. 2001047-CA
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intended to voluntarily relinquish his reasonable
expectation of privacy in his apartment.

The trial court

erred in allowing evidence obtained from the defendant's
apartment without a search warrant.
THE DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides,

in part, in "all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have Assistance of
counsel for his defense."

U. S. Const,

amend. VI.

The

right to counsel has been held to be "the right to effective
assistance of counsel."

State

v.

Templin,

(Utah 1990)/ citing State v. McNicol,

805 P.2d 182

554 P.2d 203, 204

(Utah 1976).
With respect to any ineffectiveness claim, the defendant
must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was
deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment.
UT 76,119,

State

12 P.3d 92, citing Strickland

v. Litherland,
v.

2000

Washington,

466. U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); citations omitted.

Defendant

must also show that counsel's deficient performance was
prejudicial, i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case.

Case No. 2001047-CA
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D e f e n d a n t c : :»n t e i d s t r i a 1 ::: o i i n s < *1 ' : • p e r f o r m a n c e was
deficient i:i m a t h e :
-failed to object to the State's ii ltroduction of
a 1 2 egat:i ons < » !=: ' *< >mP^t i r. \.- -.. -nce and p r o t e c t i v e
violations which were not prosecuted

f-'

order

*! ^ k of e v i d e n c e ;

*"

-failed to oh v

investigation of an attempted b r e a k - i n at the family's home
which yielded no evidence that, defendant was

invo.ved;

- f a :i ] e d t : • r e qu e s t a : i 11: a t i i e :i i I s 1

' ~

: ^ w. n g a n

unresponsive and inflammatory answer to one of the
p r o s e c u t o r ' s statements alleging deie:--...o c c a s i o n , had assaulted her and h e l a hei " h o s t a g e " ;
-failed to request a m istrial or curative

instruction

a £ t e r M r s . 1 1 o ] b e r t t e s t i f i e d a b o i I t d e f e i I d a n t'" s p r i o i
conviction for simple assault and other prior bad a c t s ;
-fai:eu to prepare witnesses to te^tii^

... *.ne

defendant's b e h a l f ,
-failed to request a jury instruction on defendant's
11; i e o r y o f s e ] f d e f e n s e .
C o u n s e l ' s f a:: ; u r e tc see k a c u r a t i v e i n s t r u c t i o n a f t e r
t h e j u r y r e c e i v e d e v i d e n c e c\

ne lerer.uar;' ' s p r i o r c r i m e s

and bad cor ; . -- . ana the iacK ui wxtne^s
atfected nhr- outcome

.>f the case.

preparation

The damaging

evidence

went directly to the jury's assessment of the defendant's
credibility.
When the defendant does not object on the record to
evidence admitted at trial relief on appeal is only
available to him if admission of the evidence was plain
See, State

error.

v.

Garcia,

1123,(citation omitted).
that

2001 UT App 19, 16, 18 P.3d

"Plain error requires a showing

,fl

(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have

been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome" for the defendant.
Id.

at 1 7 (quoting State v.

1993))."

Dunn,

850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah

To show obviousness of the error, the defendant

must show that the law was clear at the time of trial.
citing State v.

Ross,

Id,

951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)

(error is not plain where there was no settled appellate law
to guide the trial court).
Failure to Object to Irrelevant
Evidence Is Defective Performance.
During the State's case in chief, the prosecutor
elicited testimony of an incident investigated Detective
Croyle which did not result in prosecution of the defendant.
Croyle testified she worked with Mrs. Holbert on a June 3rd
Case No. 2001047-CA
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ma 11 e i,
case.

n

- :

^'

: .

- r r r t e ct i ve o rde r

A n d ended up b e i n g , due to the fact that there was

r~t enough c^ysical e v i d e n c e collected .it. the ucene, i I1 'UM1
i inal: >] e 1 - I: x j: >roseci ited.

R. 220 p 2 0 5 .

The d e t e c t i v e

continued that she qo: "all the p o l i c e r e p o r t s " and
submit tie a ci^i

a tt

f

'

-.

~>

a v i - b e c a u s e its c l a s s i f i e d as a v i o l a t i o n p r o t e c t i v e order
11

* x : screened and u] t i m a t e l y d e c l i n e d b e c a u s e there was no

::

'" .

Defense counsel did

not object it one t e s t i m o n y .
T e s t i m o n y about ' h ^ n r i o r

. .

of a p r o t e c t i v e order which was "unable t^ ~e p r o s e c u t e d " is
clearly irrelevant and i n a d m i s s i b l e u n d e r Rule 4 02 of the
Ru 1 es c > f E v :i • :ience ,

A--

II

relevant is not a d m i s s i b l e - .

_I^J .-•.%

L
* .- -r.admissi-

b i l i t y of irrelevant e v i d e n c e was estai - isnea at \. v

The testimony '.r

..--

^ u e pri^r

other "wrongs or a c t s "

r e l e v a n c e to the o f f e n s e tried and ;s .inadmissible under
Rule 404 of the R u l e s of E v i d e n c e .

u.. .:-_.. , ,

• >* h ^ \

-'-

i J UN

, y/r -n v

-t , I'm 1

o±v

e v i d e n c e of

tu p r o v e

c h a r a c t e r cf p e r s o n in order to show a c t i o n i n c o n f o r m i t y

f

therewith).
The detective testified, when questioned further about
her knowledge of Mrs. Holbert, of an investigation into a
reported attempted break-in at Mrs. Holberts' home.
p. 206, 207.

R. 220

According to the detective, crime scene

investigators responded to the home and obtained photographs
of some shoe prints under a window.

R.220 p. 207.

and window were processed for latent prints.

A door

R. 220 p. 207.

No prints were recovered and "there was no actually (sic)
evidence other than the photograph - " R. 220 p. 207.
The defendant was not charged in the incident, but he
was obviously a suspect in the attempted break-in because
the detective was permitted to testify that officers
conducted a search of the his apartment complex but were
unable to locate his vehicle.

R. 220 p. 207.

Despite the

absence of any evidence connecting defendant to the
attempted break-in,

the clear implication in the testimony

was that the defendant attempted to break-in to his wife's
home. R. 220 p. 206, 207.
Whether or not there was an attempted break-in at the
wife's home, the mere fact of the investigation had
absolutely nothing to do with the charge of aggravated
kidnaping and was irrelevant and, therefore,
Case No. 2001047-CA
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,r;->

' K

l" ,

Hie testimony was clearly elicited for

the purpose of proving defendant's character to act in
conformity with the aJ leydti i >\i±\ .iqdui"it I n l>> lli^ State.
Defense counsel did not object to the testimony.
Evidence of prior investigations for domestic violence
--.". :

; >' :

•• :

prosecution is irrelevant.

":

'

:

^ -

in

Evidence th'it oolice

investigated an attempted orea.-. *:. :
^•^ •

'. I 6 S U i t

. - -

oefore and that officers searched defendant's

apartment complex for his car but couldn't find it is
i rrele\; ai 1 t.
402.

I

-.-•---•.

:e::"-

-~ -—••: •

TT

- E

The law on admissibility • t irreJevant evidence was

settled at the time of tria.1, Lhererore, the admission ot
1

-:

'

•-]--•

' -•'• • ^

. :. error.

Failure to Request a Mistrial
Or To Request A Curative Instruction is
Defective Performance.
In response to defense counsel's qi lestion that Mrs.
Holbert continued to have contact with defendant,
-* * -*.
testimony o:

* +

the

—r,ons:ve answer and U3ve

r.e defendant':^ rricr conviction for assault:

the court ana I wasn't notified that h^ w^3 go^ng to court.
And ±\ he wen*" to cv;rt and pled guilty to simple assault.

Because - it's a long story, but he went to court and pled
guilty to simple assault..,"

R. 220 p 167.

The prejudicial

effect of the "other crimes" testimony compounded the
prejudicial effect of the witnesses testimony that the
defendant held her "hostage" on a prior occasion, for which
the jury did not receive a curative instruction.

Despite

the obvious reference to clearly inadmissible testimony of
defendant's "other crimes, wrong or acts" yet again, defense
counsel neither sought a mistrial nor did he seek a curative
instruction.
It is the trial court's responsibility to determine if
an incident rises to the level requiring a mistrial, and it
is the trial court which must decide if an "Nincident may
have or probably influenced the jury, to the prejudice of
[the defendant]. 1 " State v.
P.2d

19,

citing State

v.

Cardall,

Robertson,

(Utah 1997) (quoting Burton

v.

Zions

1999

UT 51 f 18,

982

932 P.2d 1219, 1230
Coop.

Mercantile

Inst.,

122 Utah 360, 249 P.2d 514, 517 (1952)).
It is well settled that other crimes testimony is
inadmissible under U.R.E. Rule 404(b).

The State

acknowledged evidence of a prior conviction to be
prejudicial to the defendant's ability to obtain a fair
trial.

After the witness testified, and during an in-
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i- : -

-.,,...:.' T - - v

O I 5uIue

phot -"Tramie

evidence reia:ea v: ' : • defendant':? ori ; assault
conviction, defense counsel st^ieo
. _..,•

-_•-,/

._, Lecord as to this incident, he has already

pled -ruilty.

"

22 2 ;; 2-16.

:

ti i e i

n-

The prosecutor responded, " m ,
• ••

*-

distinctly not sought that because I don't wanna (sic)

have

a prior conviction or some other conviction of this
-~m.

• • • .

-r

* -

:i n t m s case ;n a fa:- fashion-"' :* .

to make a determination
^22 ;~ , ~^"7.

witness's testimony about the prior assault charge, cut the
fact that he may not have heard it does not r^?n ^he m x y
:J i dn' t 1 ie a i i I:

11 i€ :i rripo r t ai It 1: h :i n g f: < :

prosecutor's remark is that he knows prior cc ::vi czI on
testimony bears on the jury's ability to make a determination of the case in a fair fashion.

Trial counsel

obviously heard the remark because his opposition to the
[ hi it nqr aphs w i h^p'l

Mn

t he | |,-t t ti it t H.st. imnnv >"'t t"h*

prior assault had already come in, yet he made no effort, to
cure the resulting harm.
Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible under rule
"n4'rx
-">•

\ r v\x

evidence is relevant to a proper, nonPag>

character purpose, unless its danger for unfair prejudice
and the like substantially outweighs its probative value.
State

v. Decorso,

1999 UT 57, ff

20-23, 993 P.2d 837, cert,

denied, 120 S.Ct. 1181 (2000). Defendant claims the prior
bad acts evidence was not relevant to a proper, noncharacter purpose, and its danger for unfair prejudice
substantially outweighed any probative value. The
introduction of "other crimes evidence" was inadmissible,
the inadmissibility of the evidence was settled at the time
of trial, therefore, admissions of "other crimes evidence"
was plain error.
Failure to Prepare Witnesses For Trial is
Defective Performance.
The defense counsel called four witnesses to testify
during the defendant's case-in-chief: two workers from the
Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS"), one
investigating police officer, and an individual who had
worked with the defendant for "four to six months" in eithe
March 1998, R. 220 p. 304, or from September 1998 to April
1999, R. 220 p. 305.
It does not appear by the trial testimony of the DCFS
workers, that trial counsel adequately prepared them for
their testimony.

Worker Jackie Bell testified in response

Case No. 2001047-CA
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1: :» tl le q u e s t J • : >i 1

o *. ii^r

L^^

• Holbertj whether she

felt that the children wouJd be safe w: 4 • \- : h u s b a n d
the witness responde.
' ' r< b e e n s i n c e

•

'

• 3 : • g ai 1 :i

^99 s o if I c a n j u s t t a k e a mirr.r e to f i n i s n

reading t h i s . " P
see ine entii

:-

Rick?"

220 p . 2 7 3 .

dijcuiiu lit

The prosecutor m e n a s K t ; • ^
i:ros,« ^v .:jm i na*

uid,

testimony from its c o n t e n t s .

r . elicitea

Worker Nancy Dunn was invited

to review her notes betore she demons Li a Led .i me^«l t:oi her
reco 1 1 ectiori t:o be refreshed:
Q:

Wei: e yoi I working with them, [Division of Child and Family
Ser vices] oi i Aug i ist 1 2 t h of 1 999?

A:

Yes I w a s .

Q:

^id you have an opportunity to meet with Suann HolbeiI
-'•*.*

Ai
n#

Yes,

^

?

I di d.

1 \. i I d t h a t w o u 1 d b e a b o u t ] : 0 0 •• : • • : ] c • • : k :i i I 11: I e a f t e r n o o n :

n.

I believe so.

?•

Did you have an opportunity to review your locb;

.. ...

I i o "i i 1 i k e t o t a k e a .1 o o k a t t h a t again?
A:
R

I did review it out in the hall.
220 p. 281.
The emp] oyer called to testify for the defendant

had v. preparation prior to his testimony.
k-

He wasn't

clearly
able

P a g e IS r i

. /

to provide clear testimony about the time period he worked
with the defendant.

On cross examination, the witness

testified:
Q:

Okay, Have you ever - and when did he terminate his
employment, regardless of the circumstances of
termination?

A:

When did he?

Q:

Yeah, when

A:

It'd have been in - probably in the fall - or I mean
excuse me, Spring.

Q:

Of-

A:

Maybe -

Q:

Of 2000 or 1999?

A:

Well, it wouldn't be 2000, and I don't think it was '99.

Q:

'98?

A:

Yes.

R. 220 p. 304.
On cross examination, the lack of preparation of the
witness was reinforced by counsel's inquiry:
Q:

Did I just sort of call you at the spur of the moment
today to come down and testify?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Did you have any time to research records of when
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e x a c t J y R i c k w a s w o r k i n g f :> r y o i 1 ?
A:

No.

F , 22 0 p . 3 0 5 . '•
The witnesses called to testify jur

[

>- r -^ • ^r* ' •

in-chief were net adequately prepared i:r r r i a i .

--- -

Failure to

performance,
E'allure to Request a S e l f - D e f e n s e
Instruction is Defective Performance
The defendant is entitled to have the ji iry instructed o n
hi s theory of the case, if there is any substantial
tO -'-.Ft

-'-- :

"

',.'

7. 477 \ . /.d T.h (Utah 1 9 6 9 * ,

23 Utah _:d 7

evidence

The aefenaai.L

contend:*:11 til 7 - v u n s e l "7s p e r f o r m a n c e w a s selective because
h e d i d n o t request a ^ell-defense i r r ^ "

4

trial court erred i ^ net providing m e

«:

i i istr ] i- zt. i on.

*••

.:>.:';.

*i, an^J 1 hat

I he

with the
. ^et tu the trial

court's failure to give * hf* instruction. .7 pdr~v rr-jy not
abbiijii cab eiiur any portion

' ?.ne charge or oiuission

therefrom unless he objects thereto r*-*
instructed

5----, ~tate

"
.

-•

\.

Medina

Juarez,

- a_,; ..;. a par** v ' ., la^j.ur^ ^^

object, "error may be assigned to instructions m

C

~

-, _

p

r\

> i

in

* "- JI

,-«

2C01 U7 7L*,

r

tr :-

avoid a manifest injustice."

Id.

Defendant testified that his wife aimed the gun at him
and indicated her desire that he die.

He also testified

that he was able to take the gun from her when she was
distracted, and he did point the gun back at her. Despite
his self-defense theory, trial counsel, failed to request a
self-defense instruction.

Arguably, by the time the jury

received its instruction, it was so prejudiced against the
defendant after hearing all the irrelevant, inadmissible and
prejudicial evidence of criminal investigations which did
not result in prosecution, inadmissible prior wrongs and
misdemeanor convictions, that a self-defense instruction was
unlikely to benefit the defendant.

Nonetheless, given that

the defendant's testimony that he pointed the gun at his
wife in self-defense, it was manifestly unjust that the jury
was not asked to consider the theory of his defense.

THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED KIDNAPING
Defendant contends the evidence did not support the
jury's verdict finding him guilty of aggravated kidnaping.
In addition, defendant asserts error by the trial court in
denying his motion for a new trial or alternatively a
conviction for the crime of aggravated assault because the
Case No. 2001047-CA
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aggravated ki dna;

r^-^

.•

m e r g e d with the aggravated

assault c h a r g e , n o t w : ~ h s t a n d i n a the S t a t e ' s effort to
deprive the defendant of tl le bei lefi !:: < D E: i E i.er ger i n, d :i smi :: >si i i j
t: .he aggravated assault charge right b e f o r e t r i a l .
The facts of events which occurred i nside M r s . H o l b e r t ' s
i lome

1 $ -9S

)i i Aug usl : 1 2

i

I .1 .e ; ] :i • jl .t n L , .1 £av< Dral: •] e t .c the •

jury v e r d i c t , set forth a b o v e , were eli cited p r i m a r i l y from
M r s , H o l b e r t , as only she and the defendant were presei it
:i i is:i de tl ic: ; he: - - • •

Line of t h e i n c i d e n t .

Utah courts have adopted a three p-.;r t. -l ~st to determine
j t I i dna pi r.

-L

2001 UT A p p u.^j,

:s-

.«..

il

w

*;

.

'. " -

, • . ,

I.JG

.

^i ^ taking or

confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate t h e
:

:

.

*

m o v e m e n t or confinement :

•

-

•

• ?

n. ,^r : * : - ^iiaht,

i n c o n s e q u e n t i a 1 and m e r e 1 y incidenta 1 to t:he o11 ier crin i,e;
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^ 4 r.^u ±^43 (citations omitted)).
the defendant placed the vie'

[rr '•_

a

headlcck

and dragged her down a flight of stairs, around the
apartment building and down a sidewalk.
force her into his truck.

He then tried to

The appellate court determined

that the defendant's conduct did not satisfy a single prong
of the Finlayson

three-prong test and it affirmed the

defendant's conviction.
In the instant case, the defendant's confinement was
inconsequential and incidental to the crime of aggravated
assault.

The defendant "shoved" Mrs. Holbert into her home

and shut the door behind them.

R. 220 p. 118.

The

defendant removed a gun from his waistband and pointed it at
Mrs. Holberts' head while he locked the door with his other
hand.

R. 220 p. 119.

Mrs. Holbert ran to the back door and

unlocked the chain, dead bolt and doorknob lock and opened
the door, however the defendant slammed it shut.
123.

R. 220 p.

She was either pushed by the defendant into the

bedroom, or she cannot recall how she ended up in the
bedroom.

R. 220 p. 122-124.

Defendant then shut the

bedroom door and again pointed the gun at Mrs. Holbert.
220 p. 125.
kill her.

R.

The defendant then told her he was going to

R. 220 p. 125.

The defendant was distracted by

the doorbell and he left the house.

R. 220 p. 127.

entire incident lasted approximately four minutes.
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p. 1 4 1 .
In addition to testimony from M r s . Holbert, the jury
hhidiil testimony J j i iin 111,1., Hulbert's neighbor that one of the
children reported] y told h e r "my dad's hurting m y m o m ,
220 p . 1 7 2 .
C o i i f i n e i i: iei 11 • : i : m : > verne n t :i i I 11 :i i s : • a s = • i 'a s s ] i ght,
inconsequential and merelv incidental t_ trie other crime
Mjjjia.i.q \,. "..-., \i^^

.^uri , ' .^ racts ^f

:\is ^?.se more

accurately fit the crime oi £'i.r av;-.:» :
14.
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I <

:

'_oped that they would convict h-Liu on anoravated

assault because I fe.1 t that the facts of this case more
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•

: ed, ai I

n igl I t: r j n ist

, . sense ?: Justice, ;s that would have been m o r e

<:.:..:!;

He movement ^r confinement

was very slight.'"

Id.

Even the trial ouurt :-"

the first proncf of the Finlayson

test w ^ satisfied.

Secorn J ,, " KJ i nil i i M I I I I * :on f i rittniri 11
nature of an '^ciqravated assault.
c< . •

. •

J.n response to the trial

i, 'l do you not agree t h a t . . . every time a

..- .

p e r s o n pulls m g u n on somebody,
there is

Case iNc

inherent a d e t e n t i o n ? "
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he

'
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t
R, z23 p . J' '. The

.
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prosecutor argued "no," that there are a "myriad of
circumstances where guns have been pulled on people in
public places where they're capable of just taking off-" R.
223 p. 17.

However, if capacity to flee is a legitimate

consideration, then the prosecutor is assuming that some
victims with the capacity to flee but who do not flee are
somehow contributing to their confinement.

Capacity to flee

is not the test: The test is inherent nature of the other
crime, and the trial court properly recognized the inherent
nature of a detention in an aggravated assault.
Third, the confinement and movement have no significance
independent of an aggravated assault.

Mrs. Holbert

testified that the defendant pointed the gun as he was
trying to lock the front door and chased her until they
eventually ended up in the bedroom, where he threatened to
kill her.

The locking of the front door merely made the

commission of the assault easier and it lessened the risk of
detection by the children.
The evidence did not support the jury's finding of guilt
to the offense of aggravated kidnaping.

The facts in this

instance satisfy all three prongs of Finlayson.

The

defendant should have been afforded the benefit of merger of
aggravated kidnaping with aggravated assault.
Case No. 2001047-CA
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THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS
COMMITTED DURING TRIAL UNDERMINES CONFIDENCE
THAT A FAIR TRIAL WAS HAD.
Under the cumulative error doctrine, a verdict will be
reversed only if "the cumulative effect of the several
errors undermines our confidence...that a fair trial was
had."

State v. Colwell,

2000 UT 8, 144, 994 P.2d 177. The

cumulative effect of the errors during this trial supports a
finding of "no confidence" that a fair trial was had.
Once again, the errors claimed include testimony of
domestic violence and protective order violations for which
the defendant was not prosecuted for lack of evidence;
testimony of an attempted break-in at the family's home
which yielded no evidence that defendant was involved; no
curative instruction following an unresponsive and
inflammatory answer to one of the prosecutor's statements
alleging defendant, on a prior occasion, had assaulted her
and held her "hostage"; no self-defense instruction; no
request for mistrial after Mrs. Holbert testified about
defendant's prior conviction for simple assault and other
prior bad acts; defense counsel's failure to limit the scope
of cross examination for one of his witnesses which
permitted damaging testimony against the defendant, and
Case No. 2001047-CA
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defense counsel's failure investigate and subpoena witnesses
provided to him by the defendant as potential character
witnesses and rebuttal witnesses to Mrs. Holbert's version
of her relationship with the defendant.

Those errors are

compounded by the court's denial of efforts by counsel to
exclude evidence illegally obtained without a search warrant
and prior bad act or bad character testimony.

CONCLUSION
The law with respect to the inadmissibility of
prejudicial and irrelevant testimony is well settled.
Testimony about domestic violence and protective order
violations, declarations that the defendant's wife was the
"victim of domestic violence" and the investigation into the
attempted break-in of Mrs. Holbert's home was elicited by
the State solely for the purpose of demonstrating to the
jury that the defendant must have kidnaped his wife at
gunpoint because his character was presumed to be bad.

That

portrayal of the defendant was bolstered by Mrs. Holbert's
statement that the defendant had held her "hostage" on a
previous occasion.

Without benefit of a curative

instruction at the time of the remark essentially eliminated
any possibility the jury could have reasonably concluded
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anything but guilt on the charge of aggravated kidnaping.
Defendant was not convicted based upon the evidence of the
events on August 12, 1999; defendant was convicted on the
basis of previous unprosecuted charges of domestic violence,
the inference that he had attempted a break-in at his wife's
home, and inflammatory descriptions of prior domestic
violence offered for "foundational" purposes.
The evidence elicited during trial was prejudicial to
the defendant because there were no other witnesses to the
events inside the home at the time Mrs. Holbert claimed to
have been confined by the defendant.

The jury had to choose

between two contradictory versions of the same event:

Mrs.

Holbert's version that the defendant forced his way into the
home, chased her through the house and confined her in the
bedroom at gunpoint for four minutes, and the defendants
version that Mrs. Holbert set him up by calling him the
night before to invite him to spend time with his family,
she the led him into the home, pulled a gun on him, was
distracted by the children outside which enabled the
defendant to take the gun from her, he pointed the gun at
her briefly and in self-defense, and he left the home.

But

for testimony that defendant had pled guilty to assault
before, that he had held his wife hostage before, and that
Case No. 2001047-CA

Page 45 of 47

he was suspected of attempting to break into his wife's home
before,

there is a

reasonable likelihood that the jury's

verdict would have been different.
The trial court committed reversible error in admitting
evidence of prior crimes, wrongs and acts which bears on the
jury's ability to make a determination in the case in a fair
fashion, and for refusing to grant defendant's motion to
arrest judgment.
The cumulative errors committed by the trial court,
including evidence of prior crimes, wrongs and acts, and
admitting evidence obtained from the defendant's apartment
without a search warrant, as well as the errors committed by
trial counsel which facilitated inadmissible, irrelevant and
prejudicial evidence to be considered by the jury raise
fundamental questions of fairness arising from the
possibility that the defendant's conviction was not based
upon evidence of the events of August 12, 1999, but was
based upon his presumed bad character.
DATED this

A

) day of YWJXA/^

> 2002

laron S. Sipes
Attorney for Appellant
Richard L. Holbert
Case No. 2001047-CA

Page 46 of 47

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ''J
day of ._
mail a true and
>Jr^-^7(jD^mail^d postage prepaid first class ma
correct copy of the foregoing document to:
Mark Shurtliff
Utah Attorney General
Laura B. Dupaix
Assistant Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South 6th Floor
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Sharon S. Sipes

^\M

Case No. 2001047-CA

i^MA^^^J

Page 47 of 47

